We offer a novel motivational account of romantic love, which portrays it as a means to the end of feeling significant and worthy. According to the model, falling in love with a partner depends on the actor's perceptions that (1) the partner possesses meritorious characteristics, and (2) that they appreciate the actor and view them as significant. We assume that these two factors multiplicatively combine with the magnitude of actor's quest for significance to determine the likelihood of actor becoming enamored (...) with partner. The multiplicative model has two major implications: 1. If any one of the partner's merit, appreciation, or actor's significance quest factors falls below its respective threshold of acceptability (such that it is subjectively non-existent), the likelihood of falling in love will be negligible. 2. Above their acceptability thresholds, levels of (partner's) merit, appreciation and (actor's) significance quest factors compensate for one another. A partner's lower standing on merit or appreciation is compensated in its impact on falling in love by the partner's higher standing on the remaining dimension. Furthermore, lower levels of either or both of these factors are compensated for by the actor's higher level of significance quest. Our model affords a broad account of diverse love phenomena, allows the derivation of several specific hypotheses supported by prior close-relations research as well as new data, and it offers novel avenues for further research on classic issues in romantic love. The discussion considers our model's unique implications and examines its relation to other theories of love. (shrink)

The novel correspondence metaphor outlined by Koriat & Goldsmith offers important advantages for studying critical issues of memory-accuracy. It also fits well with the current emphasis on the reconstructive nature of memory and on the role of cognitive, metacognitive, and motivational factors in memory performance. These positive features notwithstanding, the storehouse/correspondence framework faces potential perils having to do with its implied linkage to the laboratory/real-life controversy and its proposal of studying correspondence issues in isolation from memory phenomena captured by the (...) storehouse paradigm. (shrink)

This collection, published in 1988, brings an innovative perspective to research in social cognition.

The reader begins with an original paper by the editors that introduces the social-personality perspective on motivational science and provides an integrated review of empirical and theoretical contributions. Major issues in motivational science are identified that form the basis for the organization of the book. Each section of the book also has a brief introduction, suggested additional readings, and questions for discussion.

We present a new theoretical construct labeled motivational readiness. It is defined as the inclination, whether or not ultimately implemented, to satisfy a desire. A general model of readiness is described which builds on the work of prior theories, including animal learning models and personality approaches, and which aims to integrate a variety of research findings across different domains of motivational research. Components of this model include the Want state, and the Expectancy of being able to satisfy that Want. We (...) maintain that the Want concept is the critical ingredient in motivational readiness: without it, readiness cannot exist. In contrast, some motivational readiness can exist without Expectancy. We also discuss the role of incentive in motivational readiness. Incentive is presently conceived of in terms of a Match between a Want and a Perceived Situational Affordance. Whereas in classic models incentive was portrayed as a first order determinant of motivational readiness, here we describe it as a second order factor which affects readiness by influencing Want, Expectancy, or both. The new model’s relation to its theoretical predecessors, and its implications for future research, also are discussed. (shrink)

The contributions in this volume treat aspects and manifestations of this cultural symbiosis, and they throw new light on authors and texts both more and less ...

Directional deep brain stimulation contacts provide greater spatial flexibility for therapy than traditional ring-shaped electrodes, but little is known about longitudinal changes of impedance and orientation. We measured monopolar and bipolar impedance of DBS contacts in 31 patients who underwent unilateral subthalamic nucleus deep brain stimulation as part of a randomized study. At different follow-up visits, patients were assigned new stimulation configurations and impedance was measured. Additionally, we measured the orientation of the directional lead during surgery, immediately after surgery, and (...) 1 year later. Here we contrast impedances in directional versus ring contacts with respect to local anatomy, active stimulation contact, and over time. Directional contacts display larger impedances than ring contacts. Impedances generally increase slightly over the first year of therapy, save for a transient decrease immediately post-surgery under general anesthesia during pulse generator placement. Local impedances decrease at active stimulation sites, and contacts in closest proximity to internal capsule display higher impedances than other anatomic sites. DBS leads rotate slightly in the immediate postoperative period but otherwise remain stable over the following year. These data provide useful information for setting clinical stimulation parameters over time. (shrink)

I have three main objectives in this essay. First, in chapter 2, I shall put forward and justify what I call worldlessness, by which I mean the following: All truths (as well as falsehoods) are wholly independent of any circumstances, not only time and place but also possible worlds. It follows from this view that whatever is actually true must be taken as true with respect to every possible world, which means that all truths are (in a sense) necessary. However, (...) the account I shall propound is different from what is known in the trade as necessitarianism, i.e. the view that there is only one possible world, viz. the actual one, for the doctrine of the worldlessness of truth values, despite its commitment to the necessity of truths and falsehoods, is quite compatible with the idea of there being other possible worlds. Another important issue in chapter 2, explored in particular in section 2.12, is the claim that there is no real change in the world. Secondly, in chapter 3 I consider the eminent traditional argument for determinism, deriving from Aristotle, namely, logical determinism, i.e. determinism justified by an appeal to the logical principle of bivalence (that all proper statements, including those concerning the future, are either true or false). In this connection I try to show that, (i), the formulation of the conclusion of this argument as "Whatever will happen will happen of necessity" is implausible, at least from the modern point of view, (ii), the formulation as "Whatever will happen will happen inevitably" is more to the point, and (iii), on the basis of the worldless and timeless aspect advocated in chapter 2, this latter formulation is quite harmless, essentially amounting to the trivial statement, "Whatever will happen will happen". Thirdly, in chapter 4 I study theological determinism, or determinism that arises from God's supposed providential control over everything that happens. In this connection, I shall survey some historical accounts of the relation between human free will and determinism (not only theological but also causal determinism); the philosophers the views of whom I shall attend to include Chrysippus, St. Augustine, Boethius and Aquinas. I shall in particular consider G.W. Leibniz' theodicean aspirations, viz. his solution to the problem of evil and, especially, his compatibilist attempts to reconcile human free will with the strictly deterministic flow of actual events. I think it is important to try to explicate Leibniz' ingenious account of these matters, since it seems that it has not been fully appreciated in the literature, not even by contemporary Leibniz scholars (such as B. Mates, R.C. Sleigh, C. Wilson, R.M. Adams and D. Rutherford). In providing the Leibnizian compatibilist solution of the problem of determinism and freedom in chapter 4, I shall utilize the approach of chapter 2. (shrink)

Multiple Originals: New Approaches to Hebrew Bible Textual Criticism. By Gary D. Martin. SBL Text-Critical Studies, vol. 7. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2010. Pp. xiv + 341. $42.95.

W. Kneale; VI—Time and Eternity in Theology, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 61, Issue 1, 1 June 1961, Pages 87–108, https://doi.org/10.1093/ari.